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INTRODUCTORY ESSAY
“WHAT THE WORLD LOOKS LIKE”:  
ON BANALITY AND SPECTACLE
GRAHAM MacPHEE AND ANGELA NAIMOU 
Nobody cares any longer what the world looks like.
—Hannah Arendt, “What Remains? The Language Remains” 
(1964)
I
We live in what is widely described as an age of perpetual, global war: a 
condition of war whose spatial extension spans the surface of the planet, 
the height of its airspace, and the depth of its oceans, and whose time 
envisages no end.1 Bodies and environments become incidental victims 
in the search for targets. War noise—barely heard at a distance by some, 
not heard at all by others, or perhaps made by the pounding of one’s 
own skull for those considered targets—becomes a chronic drone. As 
with earlier imperial and proxy wars, contemporary war lulls some into 
acting as though they do not live in wartime while compelling others to 
confront their everyday vulnerability every day. If contemporary war has 
an antonym, it is neither “peace” nor “norm.”
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War has become such a pervasive discursive frame for organizing 
social, cultural, economic, and political life that it has come to operate 
almost as if it were a dead metaphor—like using the term “typing” in 
reference to a computer keyboard. War extends beyond literal war zones 
and seeps into the social and cultural imagination more broadly, where 
it merges with longer histories of racial violence that underpin ideas of 
peaceful order and security. In the United States, the routine traffic stop is 
a minor annoyance for some but a dreaded encounter for those for whom 
the threat of unprovoked assault and escalation feels routine, as if traffic 
stops become military checkpoints (Swaine, Lartey, and Laughland 2015). 
So, protesters against the routinization of police brutality face SWAT 
units armed with riot gear, tear gas, armored personnel carriers, and the 
rhetoric of war; unarmed people are declared justifiably killed for any 
expression of resistance to arrest, including staying still; kindergartners 
are arrested by police officers in schools for throwing tantrums and are 
funneled through the criminal justice system; and older schoolchildren 
are tasered, maced, shackled, body slammed, arrested, and even shot for 
failing to follow instructions, talking back to authorities, or getting into 
fistfights.2
Against this vision of the present, to suggest that war has been banalized 
may at first sound callous, as though to suggest that its pervasiveness has 
made war into something trite, trivial, or petty in the familiar ways that 
the term “banal” is used to devalue what is common. Such a conventional 
understanding of banality assumes an absolute disconnection between 
war and everyday life, forgetting their complex historical entwinement 
and mutual constitution. The term “banal” itself originally referred to 
“compulsory feudal service,” locating its etymology in the encompassing 
economic, social, and political order of feudalism, where military 
obligations were woven into everyday life.3 War and the everyday have not 
suddenly come into conflict or complicity, but have historically required 
and structured each other. In feudal societies this interdependence was 
visible; but in modernity a different configuration of appearance obtains, 
within which the interdependence of violence and civility disappears.
As Howard Caygill observes, modern politics is premised on “the 
removal of violence from everyday life and its concentration in a 
centralized bureaucratic administration” (1994, 50), a reconceptualization 
of politics famously identified by Immanuel Kant as the trajectory towards 
“perpetual peace” (1991).4 But such a frame, Caygill argues, “is ill-suited for 
reflecting on the theme of violence” since “the very context of civility is 
established by the exclusion of violence.” From this perspective, “violence 
is in every respect the exception, whether as a sign of the breakdown 
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of civility, or else as the potential force which protects the borders of 
civility.” Conversely, such a “notion of civil freedom requires that violence 
be concentrated in the state, and preferably in the hands of professionals 
such as police and military.” This separation of violence and civility in 
modernity engenders a new structuring of appearance: “the overall effect,” 
Caygill writes, “is to remove responsibility for violence from civil society 
and to obscure its complicity with civil freedom” (1994, 23). The violence 
disposed to defend the space of politics at its borders is depoliticized, and 
so becomes a spectacle to be observed by a passive citizenry. At the same 
time, social relations are recast as pacific and noncoercive, so that the 
“violence of civility” is rendered invisible (24).
To speak of the banalization of war is not, then, to belittle or downplay 
the destructiveness of militarized violence. The task instead is to take 
seriously the commonplaceness of war, to examine how war structures the 
everyday and, conversely, to consider how the structuring of the everyday 
drives, organizes, and occludes the militarized violence upon which it 
depends. The focus on banality in this special issue is a way of making 
visible this configuration of appearance, in which violence either appears 
as spectacular or disappears as banal. In this economy of apperception, 
the highly publicized images of “shock and awe” bombings and the 
unpublicized drone strikes are deeply connected: one ratifies the other, 
one promises to terrorize its targets through their affective response while 
the other portends its potential to come before one knows it has struck. 
The lethal fireworks of “shock and awe” are the other side of the torture 
at Abu Ghraib, Bagram, and other, unidentified black sites. The horrors 
of dictatorial regimes that target and torture their own citizens are the 
complement of the long-term economic aid and political support those 
same dictators receive. The graphic images of violence captured on video 
are the obverse of the chronic slow death of peoples under occupation or 
tyranny. Banality and spectacle are each other’s corollary: this is what the 
world looks like.
War both establishes and destabilizes the fundamental distinctions 
between civilian and combatant, citizen and alien, and the lawful and 
the illegitimate. New modes of military violence in the post–Cold War, 
post–9/11 present have exposed the fragility of another set of distinctions, 
namely that between emergency and routine, crisis and continuity, the 
spectacular and the prosaic, the extraordinary and the banal. Military 
violence, traditionally justified as the temporary and necessary suspension 
of the norms of civility in a state of exception, gives way to routinized 
forms of militarized violence in everyday life—from state surveillance of 
the everyday and the suppression of political dissent in the name of security 
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to the deployment of military technologies and combat weapons in police 
actions, border patrols, and the development of consumer goods. In the 
countless acts of militarized violence that may fall under the aggregate 
category of the global War on Terror, state and transnational actors have 
used imperial and insurgent modes of war that structure and suffuse the 
fabric of social, economic, and political life in innumerable ways.
In This Muslim American Life, Moustafa Bayoumi suggests that “we 
do not yet understand or appreciate the profound ways that the War 
on Terror has created a political ecology of its own, one that relies 
on excessive secrecy, differential rights, innovative forms of racism, 
expanded executive power, and permanent war, while also threatening to 
undermine our bedrock principles of equality and privacy” (2015, 19).5 If 
we take the banalization of war as a core feature of the War on Terror, one 
way to examine this emergent “political ecology” is to identify its complex 
interrelationships, to trace the links between militarized violence or 
militant-like fetishizations of violence within the United States (mass 
shootings, unjustified police killings, the mass incarceration of aliens 
and citizens, the War on Drugs) and the violence of the global War on 
Terror overseas (military and counterinsurgency battles, drone attacks, 
airstrikes, kidnappings, torture, and indefinite detention). Because war 
is much more than military violence, involving institutions of knowledge 
production, economies, and cultural historical practices, these interrela-
tionships also cross over into mundane practices and non-violent 
cultural habits—as in the case of the development of the Internet or the 
origin of Daylight Saving Time (Dudziak 2013, 11–32). Sometimes the 
links between war and the everyday are traceable; sometimes, the full 
commonplaceness of war—in its anticipations and aftereffects—makes 
them too diffuse to track.
As Patrick Deer observes in his essay in this issue, the rhetoric of war 
has become a way to structure our understanding of nearly any struggle 
where winning is said to assure safety and well-being: the battle against 
cancer, the culture wars, the sex wars, and so on. The War on Drugs is 
now widely accepted as having been “lost”—but, as Chenjerai Kuminyaka 
suggests in his contribution to the Critical Forum section below, the 
real failure may be located in the declaration of the war metaphor itself, 
in the launching of a response to drug addiction as war. The power of 
the war metaphor is that it can simultaneously justify and mask literal 
warfare: as both a “war” on drugs and yet not really a war, not a real war 
as such. The banality of war metaphors occludes the violence of literal 
warfare by drawing attention to it; making a spectacle of the banal, it 
banalizes spectacle.
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II
Violence and civility, war and the quotidian, structure each other in the 
formation of the banalities of private life, in our most humdrum and 
intimate moments. Bayoumi notes the psychical effects of surveillance on 
what may be the most banal feature of humanity: idle thoughts, an inner 
life. He writes, “having something to hide—or having the right to hold an 
inner life and to be free to determine how much of yourself you show to 
others—is not only a guarantee of our democracy but also a necessary part 
of being human.” The “dark innovation of the Patriot Act” is not merely 
the invocation of wartime security to justify the overreach of state power 
into the everyday life of citizens: it is the transformation of our political 
imagination of civility, an injury to the relation between citizen and state 
(2015, 18). As Elaine Scarry writes,
The Patriot Act inverts the constitutional requirement that people’s lives 
be private and the work of government officials be public; it instead crafts 
a set of conditions in which our inner lives become transparent and the 
workings of the government become opaque. Either one of these outcomes 
would imperil democracy; together they not only injure the country but 
also cut off the avenues of repair. (Scarry 2013; quoted in Bayoumi 2015, 18)
What Scarry describes is nothing less than the reformulation of the 
political condition of appearance in modern, formally democratic societies. 
Or what Hannah Arendt would describe as the disintegration of care for 
“what the world looks like” (2013, 34). This bridge to Arendt’s terminology 
is worth dwelling on because our special issue consciously invokes and 
seeks to rethink for our contemporary moment Arendt’s striking but 
difficult formulation—the banality of evil.
Arendt’s invention of a new political category for modernity in her 
report on the Eichmann trial was and has remained contentious and 
disputed. In large part, this has to do with the deliberately rebarbative style 
of thinking and writing she adopted in the face of the political and moral 
collapse revealed by National Socialism (see Knott 2014, 15–29). But it also 
has to do with the economical and elusive manner of its introduction when 
her report was first published in 1963 as a book, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 
where it was provocatively deployed as the work’s subtitle. Initially the 
phrase was taken by some to imply a sneering disregard for the victims 
of the Final Solution and a perverse dismissal of the enormity of the acts 
committed by its perpetrators. However, while these initial reactions no 
longer dominate discussion (Berkowitz 2013), the formulation remains 
potentially problematic within contemporary academic frameworks in 
at least two different ways. Most directly, this difficulty resides in her 
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elliptical elaboration of the phrase in terms of “sheer thoughtlessness,” 
her claim that Eichmann “lacked imagination,” and that “he merely, to 
put the matter colloquially, never realized what he was doing” (1965, 287: 
emphasis in original). When taken in isolation such statements appear to 
offer a reductively subjective approach which functions, in turn, through a 
reduced notion of Eichmann’s own motivation and subjective commitment 
to the political project of National Socialism. By accepting the lie of 
Eichmann’s smallness—his lack of motivation or commitment, his status 
merely as a conscientious bureaucrat—so it is said, Arendt dangerously 
underestimates the destructive potential of totalitarian ideology and the 
movements it would sustain.6
More diffusely, we might also see a different kind of difficulty for the 
value and usefulness of Arendt’s formulation in a theoretical environment 
that has become especially sensitive to the radical potential of the everyday, 
whether in terms of micronarratives, minor literatures, micropolitics, 
performativity, the rhizomatic, the lateral, the contingent, or the material. 
From this perspective, in associating “evil” with “banality” understood 
as the commonplace or prosaic, Arendt appears to disregard the critical 
potential of everyday discourses and practices for unmasking and subverting 
the violent strategies and will to domination of transcendent ontologies 
of essence and presence: of grand narratives of progress and universality 
and of all-consuming structures of power and governmentality. In the first 
case, “banal” is taken as a subjective judgment that arrogantly dismisses the 
complex motivations exhibited by those drawn to totalitarian ideologies. 
In the second, it is seen as failing to appreciate the political resources 
available in the interactions of everyday life, which are devalued as “banal” 
against more philosophically august paradigms. In both cases, this stance 
appears to involve a withdrawal from social life—exhibiting either an 
exorbitantly subjective self-regard or a blindness to the granular texture 
of prosaic, material existence. Given the resonance of Arendt’s association 
with the formulation “banality,” any project that operates in its shadow or 
under its sign would need to address such claims. And without seeking to 
enlist all the contributions to this special issue as necessarily “Arendtian” 
or impute to them a shared commitment to her work, it is fair to say that 
this project was conceived in the belief that both of these interpretations 
profoundly misunderstand and massively underestimate the unsettling 
force of Arendt’s conception of “banality.”
One way to assay Arendt’s complex thinking of this term is provided 
by her discussion of thinking and thoughtlessness in an interview with 
Joachim Fest broadcast on German television in 1964. “Thoughtlessness,” 
she had observed in the Eichmann book, is “something [that is] by no 
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means identical with stupidity” (1965, 287–88). In the interview with Fest, 
she elaborates on her pairing of “thinking” and “thoughtlessness” in terms 
of spatio-temporal experience, of the Mitsein of Dasein:7
There’s an English idiom, “Stop and Think.” Nobody can think unless 
they stop. If you force someone into remorseless activity, or they allow 
themselves to be forced into it, it’ll always be the same story, right? You’ll 
always find an awareness of responsibility can’t develop. It can only develop 
in the moment when a person reflects—not on himself, but on what he’s 
doing. (Arendt 2013, 60)
The key to understanding Arendt’s remark is in the final qualification, 
that “thinking” in her sense involves reflection not on oneself but on 
what one is doing. For Arendt “doing,” or what she more typically calls 
“action” and “acting together,” is never wholly subjective or self-involved 
but is always intersubjective and so “worldy.” Indeed, as she writes in 
The Human Condition, action “constitutes” the “public part of the world 
common to us all”; “it is the space of appearance in the widest sense of 
the word, namely the space where I appear to others as others appear to 
me” (Arendt 1958, 198).8 “Thinking” for Arendt is not self-contemplation 
but reflection on action understood as the constitution of the “world,” “as 
the space in which things become public, as the space in which one lives” 
(2013, 34). And “the reality of the world,” she observes, “is guaranteed by 
the presence of others” (1958, 199). As such, “thinking” must necessarily 
address, be informed by, and be open to human plurality, since “plurality 
. . . is the sine qua non for that space of appearance which is the public 
realm.” Indeed, “the calamities of action” arise “from the attempt to do 
away with this plurality,” which “is always tantamount to the abolition of 
the public realm itself” (220).
Arendt’s conception of thinking and action is neither solipsistic nor 
insensitive to the everyday interactions of social life; rather it is intensely 
worldly. This is made clear most famously in chapter 9 of The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, “The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the 
Rights of Man,” where Arendt discusses the modern national state’s 
propensity to violence as it is revealed by the predicament of the stateless. 
As she writes, “the first loss that the rightless suffered was . . . the loss 
of the entire social texture into which they were born and in which 
they established for themselves a distinct place in the world” (1973, 293). 
She continues,
The fundamental deprivation of human rights is manifested first and 
above all in the deprivation of a place in the world which makes opinions 
significant and actions effective. Something much more fundamental 
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than freedom and justice, which are rights of citizens, is at stake when 
belonging to the community into which one is born is no longer a matter of 
course and not belonging no longer a matter of choice. . . . This extremity, 
and nothing else, is the situation of the people deprived of human rights. 
(Arendt 1973, 296)
What the “Rights of Man” fail to understand is their prior embodiment 
in “social texture,” the myriad and overlapping networks of affiliation 
and recognition whose operation, at the barest minimum, would include 
custom, belief, language, idiom, intonation, tempos of speech, protocols 
of behavior and nonverbal interaction, phenotypical characteristics, 
and modes of dress, gait, and styling, as well as routine patterns of 
social interaction, transaction, and interchange. “The calamity of the 
rightless,” Arendt insists, “is not that they are deprived of life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness, or of equality before the law and freedom 
of opinion—formulas which were designed to solve problems within 
given communities—but that they no longer belong to any community 
whatsoever” (295). “No law exists for them” because they are no longer 
drawn into and acknowledged within the linkages and connections of 
social texture; they become “superfluous” because “nobody [could] be 
found to ‘claim’ them.” “The Nazis started their extermination of the 
Jews,” she notes, not just by revoking their legal status but also by “cutting 
them off from the world of the living” (296). The Nazi genocides depended 
on the exclusion of populations from “a place in the world,” a worldlessness 
that was ruthlessly and determinedly enforced and relentlessly pursued 
towards its conclusion.
It is less often mentioned, however, that Arendt saw another kind of 
“worldlessness” among the populations who produced the perpetrators. 
Indeed, this is the central concern of what is perhaps her most philosoph-
ically audacious and innovative work, The Origins of Totalitarianism, first 
published in 1951. In an interview with Günther Gaus, she also identifies 
this worldlessness in terms of the disintegration of social texture, but now 
not purposefully enforced but arising unconsciously from the rhythms of 
capital, the cycles “of laboring and consuming” (2013, 34). This “peculiar 
loneliness . . . consists in being thrown back upon oneself; a state of affairs 
in which, so to speak, consumption takes the place of all the truly relating 
activities” (34–35). And in this loneliness “nobody cares any longer what 
the world looks like” (34). That is, nobody tends or cares for “the space of 
appearance in the widest sense of the word,” the space “guaranteed by the 
presence of others, by its appearing to all,” the space of “plurality” which 
is “the public realm itself” (1958, 198, 199, 220).
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Taken together, this double diagnosis of the disintegration of social 
texture and the predicament of worldlessness helps to understand Arendt’s 
invention of a new political category, the “banality of evil.” “The trouble 
with Eichmann,” she writes in the epilogue to Eichmann in Jerusalem, 
“was precisely that so many were like him, and that the many were not 
perverted or sadistic, that they were, and still are, terribly and terrifyingly 
normal” (1965, 276). This is not a claim about Eichmann’s lack of personal 
attributes; it is not that he was an automaton or bureaucratic robot bereft 
of the individual motivations, personal convictions, or emotional conflicts 
of a “normal” person. Indeed, it is the “normality” of Eichmann’s sense of 
his own personal conviction wherein the challenge to traditional modes 
of legal jurisprudence arises. Traditional legal paradigms would judge 
criminal responsibility in terms of the intentions of the individual and 
their transgression of socially sanctioned legal norms. Arendt’s point 
is that the Nazi genocides exceed the terms of such an individualized 
conception of criminal responsibility:
From the standpoint of our legal institutions and our moral standards of 
judgment, this normality was much more terrifying than all the atrocities 
put together, for it implied . . . that this new type of criminal, who is in 
actual fact hostis generis humani [an enemy of mankind], commits his crimes 
under circumstances that make it well-nigh impossible for him to know or 
to feel that he is doing wrong. (Arendt 1965, 276)
Eichmann points to a larger problem, in Arendt’s view, not because he 
was without the individual resources or strength of character needed to 
avoid committing criminal acts, the individual resources to enable “him 
to know or to feel that he is doing wrong.” It is rather that his criminality 
was enabled, intensified, and made all the more sustainable and brutally 
effective precisely because he was in full possession of them. Arendt’s grim 
humor is directed at the ample evidence that Eichmann extravagantly 
reflected on himself, but not on what he was doing.
Arendt’s turn to “banality” is, then, a way of relocating the happening 
of the Nazi genocides within the disintegration of social texture and the 
predicament of worldlessness. The crucial step for Arendt is to expand 
the purview of criminal responsibility beyond the individual but without 
abnegating the force of individual guilt (1965, 278). Or in the terms we have 
identified above, it was to place Eichmann’s actions within the condition 
where “nobody cares any longer what the world looks like” (2013, 34), to 
locate it within the “circumstances that make it well-nigh impossible for 
him to know or to feel that he is doing wrong” (276; emphasis added). But 
as Arendt explains to Fest, in so doing she needs to “qualify” or elucidate 
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her earlier pronouncement that Eichmann “doesn’t actually have any 
criminal motives”; what she meant, she now indicates, was that he didn’t 
have “what is usually understood by ‘criminal motives.’” She offers instead 
the formulation that “he wanted to say ‘we,’ and going-along-with-the-rest 
and wanting-to-say-we like this were quite enough to make the greatest of 
all crimes possible” (2013, 43).
Arendt’s deployment of “banality” is not, then, the arrogant 
dismissal of individual lived experience, of the emotional conflicts and 
personal commitments of perpetrators. But equally, her conception of 
“social texture” and of a “place in the world” is not a straightforward, 
non-normative, or uncritical valorization of the prosaic, the commonplace, 
and the everyday—as the locus or principle of capillarity, materiality, or 
contingency that would undo ontologies of essence, presence, and mastery, 
for example. Instead, her conception of the “world” as “the space in which 
things become public, as the space in which one lives” (2013, 34)—whose 
“reality . . . is guaranteed by the presence of others” (1958, 199)—provides a 
propaedeutic for making critical distinctions about our necessary location 
in immanence, our thrownness as Dasein. In her interview with Fest, Arendt 
elaborates on this critical procedure by developing the abstract account 
of “acting together” that she had given in The Human Condition. Now she 
folds it back into the atomization and frightening sense of powerlessness 
which is such a pervasive concern in The Origins of Totalitarianism (see 
for example 1973, 139–57, 230–31). “So long as you’re alone,” she observes, 
“you’re always powerless, however strong you may be.” In which case, 
“going along with the rest—the kind of going along that involves lots of 
people acting together—produces power” (2013, 43). Taken abstractly, this 
sense of connectivity, affiliation, of everyday coincidence and affirmation 
in acting together is as yet undifferentiated:
This feeling of power that arises from acting together is absolutely not 
wrong in itself, it’s a general human feeling. But it’s not good, either. It’s 
simply neutral. It’s something that’s simply a phenomenon, a general 
human phenomenon that needs to be described as such. In acting in this 
way, there’s always an extreme feeling of pleasure. (Arendt 2013, 43–44)
But if acting together, as in The Human Condition, might “constitut[e]” 
the “public part of the world common to us all” and manifest the 
“plurality which is the sine qua non for that space of appearance which 
is the public realm” (1958, 220), Arendt now acknowledges (post the 
Eichmann trial in Jerusalem) that it might also operate quite differently. 
Where “acting together” is “guaranteed by the presence of others” (1958, 
199)—by plurality—it involves “discussing things together, reaching 
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certain decisions, accepting responsibility, thinking about what we are 
doing.” But as Eichmann has demonstrated, there is another, “perverse 
form of acting”—which Arendt now designates as “functioning.” “In 
this functioning,” she notes, “the feeling of pleasure is always there”; but 
what is “eliminated in functioning” is “all”: all of the “discussing things 
together, reaching certain decisions, accepting responsibility, thinking 
about what we are doing” (2013, 44). Where “thinking” requires care for 
“what the world looks like” (2013, 34)—for “the space where I appear 
to others as others appear to me” (1958, 198)—“what you have there,” 
in Eichmann’s testimony, “is mere freewheeling.” “And the pleasure in 
this mere functioning,” she writes, “this pleasure was quite evident in 
Eichmann” (2013, 44).
However we are to think the banalization of war, if we bear in mind 
Arendt’s concern for “what the world looks like” (2013, 34) then we cannot 
simply construe “banality” as a subjective judgment of disapproval or 
an uncritical valorization of what escapes the proper, the official, or the 
normative. The legacy of Arendt’s conception of the “banality of evil” 
remains contentious, but in developing that legacy by addressing the 
banalization of war we should recall what is at stake: “the reality of the 
world” as it is “guaranteed by the presence of others, by its appearing to 
all” (1958, 199).
III
Care for what the world looks like in Arendt’s sense is a core task of Dunya 
Mikhail’s poetry. An Iraqi poet who fled to the United States after being 
threatened by Saddam Hussein’s government for her publications, she was 
part of what Iraqi poetry critics had called the “war generation.” The war 
that periodized literary history here was the Iran-Iraq war (1980–1988): 
the end of that war led literary critics to anticipate a “postwar generation” 
of poets even as that war prepared the way for the next, the invasion of 
Kuwait by a cash-strapped Iraqi government and the US response—that 
spectacular display of aerial high tech warfare of the Gulf War, Operations 
Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The succession of wars prompted Mikhail 
to publish an article in the Baghdad Observer reminding those would-be 
postwar critics “that there might be no postwar generation, as the war 
seem[ed] to be contiguous. It was an ironic article, in which I objected 
to the whole situation” (2013b). Mikhail puts this continuity differently 
elsewhere, in what may be called a response to the trauma of war but is 
instead, we suggest, a response to war rendered relentlessly banal: “My 
eyes were opened to war, and now, when I close my eyes, I still see war” 
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(2010). War appears even more clearly when one has been put to sleep by 
its banality. In her poetry, spectacles of war are shot through with the 
everyday and the ordinary, and ordinary stories are rife with the effects of 
war, pointing to the impact of militarized violence on how we imagine the 
relationship between politics, society, and art.
Mikhail’s poem “The Old Olive Tree” considers violence in the context 
of the Israel-Palestine conflict. The sudden eruption of spectacular violence 
is not contrasted to the slow, grinding pace of everyday occupation—
rather, violent spectacle and banality work in cooperation with one other. 
They are inverse sides of the same territory. “The Old Olive Tree” explores 
this enmeshment of violence within civility by invoking the fatal power 
of details and the fatal effects of organizing war into a coherent narrative:
—And between the beginning
and the end
are all those details
that are killing you
and killing me.
(Mikhail 2013, 52)
A coherent story of any particular war—its causes, its course, and its 
consequences “between the beginning / and the end”—is blasted to rubble, 
fragmented into “all those details / that are killing you / and killing me.” 
Read one way, the small and the ordinary—“all those details”—appear 
as trivial matters of difference between the warring factions, detracting 
from their shared humanity. But the poem does not dismiss these details 
as trivial: “all those details” are powerful precisely because they interfere 
with the form of a coherent “plot.”
In Mikhail’s poem, such details are both dangerously excessive and 
underestimated: they enact a double violence against “you” and “me,” 
characters that cannot exist outside of the “plot” that is simultaneously 
overwhelmed and driven by those details that “are killing.” “You” and 
“me” only come together in the pronoun “us” when the two enemies are 
named by the third. Initially killed by the details that are clung to for 
survival, they become shadowy “nightmares” to be killed off a second time 
by readers whose response to details that exceed their understanding is 
boredom:
—And because the plot was hard to follow,
it bored the readers:
they fell asleep and saw us as nightmares,
and that was the end of it.
(Mikhail 2013a, 52)
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Details kill; but they also keep observers from caring about the dead. 
Boredom here is not mere disaffection by the usual stuff but the 
precondition for transforming warring factions into phantasmatic threats 
to be eliminated. The end result imagined by the speaker of the poem is 
the recognition that war narrative has failed its conventionally assumed 
purpose of convincing observers or eliciting sympathy to any one side, or 
by imaginatively bridging the distance between sides, in the best effort of 
humanistic understanding.
Details become deadly because banal—because they bore. But in boring 
they are transformed, and the particulars of human life are rendered into 
images of spectacular horror, nightmares to be killed. It is to the sea that 
the speaker looks to drown the war stories—to “cast [them] into the sea 
/ and move on.” But where and how to “move on” remains a problem the 
poem cannot resolve. As it plays on a cliché about overcoming grievance 
or injury, it cannot help but evoke the image of the stateless, the fugitive, 
the refugee—on the move, pushed into the sea, expelled or fleeing if not 
physically prevented from moving at all.
IV
This special issue of College Literature aims to be an initial staging post 
or marker for thinking the “banalization of war” as we are coming to 
understand it in the United States and in Western countries allied to 
that project after fifteen years of the “War on Terror.” This geopolitical 
demarcation is not meant to be exclusive or to discount other experiences 
of banal wartime; indeed, quite the reverse. The claims that are made here 
are urgent and we hope insightful: but they are made in the recognition of 
their limitations and spatio-temporal locality. This special issue is offered 
as a propaedeutic, not an encyclopedia.
Wartime has conventionally been located in modern Western 
discourses of civility as exceptional. And this pairing of normality and 
exception may seem to corroborate contemporary theory’s imaginary of 
order and resistance, rationality and its deconstruction, grand narrative 
and temporal dispersal. In his essay “Banal Time: War after Grand 
Narrative,” Graham MacPhee locates a discomforting echo of the 
opposition of grand narrative and temporal dispersal in the banal time 
exhibited both by the affective disposition signaled by the POW/MIA flag 
and by the conditions of apperception of the political and military decision 
makers who orchestrated the US war in Southeast Asia. To explore this 
banal time, the essay turns to Christopher Nolan’s neo-noir Memento 
(2000), whose protagonist is shown to embody the “functioning” that 
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Arendt discussed in her interview with Joachim Fest. In demonstrating 
that the banal temporality of functioning in Memento exceeds the abstract 
opposition of narrative and dispersal, the essay argues that contemporary 
theory remains disastrously ill-equipped to address the modes of agency 
and affective drive that are harnessed in the project of endless war.
Patrick Deer’s essay provides both a valuable overview of contemporary 
American war culture and an incisive argument about the cultural and 
political effects of what appears to be a paradoxical double movement: 
the distancing of the vast majority of the domestic population from the 
violent effects of war and the increasing prevalence of violence at the level 
of representation. The penetration of war culture into every aspect of 
everyday life, Deer suggests, gives rise to a more fragmented, decentered, 
and diffuse cultural authority than manifested in earlier moments of 
imperial military domination; but the banality of this cultural authority 
does not make its ability to normalize and silence the violence of war any 
the less powerful or politically significant. However, Deer sees important 
resources for challenging such a banalization of war in the HBO series 
The Wire and in a variety of contemporary writing about recent wars, 
exemplified in Ben Fountain’s novel Billy Lynn’s Long Halftime Walk (2012). 
For Deer, the pervasiveness of war culture is met with a profusion of 
counter representations, and the role of cultural analysis is to map this 
conflictual landscape in order to further “the struggle to demilitarize our 
culture” (83).
In “Robert Lowell, Perpetual War, and the Legacy of Civil War 
Elegy,” Michael LeMahieu places contemporary instances of the violence 
of civility—the killings of Jordan Russell Davis, Eric Garner, John 
Crawford, Michael Brown, and so many others—within the context of 
a much longer history of suppression, elision, and forgetting effected 
through the memorialization of violence in the United States. At its heart 
lies a subtle reading of Lowell’s “For the Union Dead” that finds in the 
poem a diagnosis of a complacency about civil rights and civil freedom 
that anticipates contemporary critiques of mainstream indifference to the 
value of black lives in contemporary America. LeMahieu thereby allows 
Lowell’s poem to be seen as a moment that has been poetically expanded 
and imaginatively written over by poets such as Kevin Young, Natasha 
Trethewey, and Claudia Rankine, each of whom in different ways places 
the memorialization of the American Civil War within the context of the 
embattled legacy of the Civil Rights struggle.9
Patricia Stuelke sees in contemporary US war culture an opportunity 
to reflect on postfeminist theorizations of desire. In “Loving in the Iraq 
War Years,” which focuses on Alicia Erian’s fiction, and especially her 
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novel Towelhead (2005), Stuelke tracks how the War on Terror discourse 
of multiculturalism has enlisted the neoliberal logic of postfeminist desire 
that emerged from sex-positive feminism. Delinked from historical and 
political context, Stuelke shows how easily an abstract concept of “desire” 
can be aligned with the neoliberal imperative to perform sexual agency 
as a mark of autonomy and as a route to establishing national citizenship. 
In Stuelke’s reading, Erian’s novel provides an unsettling vision of the 
homeland where the social and political structuring of female sexual 
desire enacts a violence that is not occluded or ignored but is rather to be 
identified with and taken for freedom.
For James Smith, the recent iteration of the Bond franchise—Skyfall 
(2012)—provides a valuable weather vane for assessing the encroachment 
of the surveillance culture associated with the NSA and its willing 
subordinate in the United Kingdom, GCHQ. If bureaucracy is, as Hannah 
Arendt put it, “rule by nobody” (1958, 40), then the Five Eyes supranational 
intelligence program is in this sense surveillance by nobody. Smith’s reading 
in “‘How Safe Do You Feel?’: James Bond, Skyfall, and the Politics of the 
Secret Agent in an Age of Ubiquitous Threat” charts the lengths to which 
the film goes in order to sustain the figure of the dashing spy-hero in an 
age dominated by digitized surveillance at source, the world of surveillance 
by nobody. But what Smith’s reading also shows is the powerful drive in 
contemporary British culture to rewrite and rearrange its own imperial 
history to accommodate the demands of US global hegemony and of the 
globalized neoliberal project.
Nadine Knight and Jane Hanley both engage with the tourist gaze 
as an optic for surveying a longer history of the banalization of war, 
although each explores a quite different context and finds very different 
insights there. In “‘A Vast Holiday Frolic’: The Touristic Potential of 
Sherman’s March to the Sea,” Knight looks at the diaries, letters, and 
memoirs of soldiers of all ranks who served in the Savannah Campaign 
and in South Carolina during the American Civil War, a campaign that 
anticipated the total war of the twentieth century in targeting civilian 
infrastructure. Knight traces the ways that soldiers drew on the tropes 
of touristic writing and travel guides to distance themselves from the 
destruction they were inflicting. But in so doing, they were remapping the 
South as a locus of tradition, Romantic ruin, and picturesque beauty that 
occluded the violence of slavery, so preparing the way for the wholesale 
reinvention of the South and the history of slavery under Jim Crow. In 
contrast, Hanley looks at the diary of a single Australian nurse, Agnes 
Hodgson, during the period of her voluntary service on the Republican 
side during the Spanish Civil War in “The Tourist Gaze in the Spanish 
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Civil War: Agnes Hodgson Between Surgery and Spectacle.” Hanley 
argues that as a woman, Hodgson had a different and less heroic style than 
the travel writing of male Australian writers in World War I, and her less 
ideologically driven motives for serving in Spain gives the everydayness of 
her writing a particular insightfulness. In contrast to fascist propaganda 
about the antireligious fervor of the Republican forces, for example, 
Hodgson describes the burning of a church as “an act of faith” of which 
“Christ might approve” (212). As Hanley notes, Hodgson often saw Spain 
through touristic stereotypes, and yet in lacking the more ideological 
framing of writers like Orwell, Hodgson’s more prosaic perspective 
nonetheless provides a valuable mode of witnessing war.
The second section of this special issue is given over to a Critical 
Forum that reflects on our title, “The Banalization of War.” The aim 
of this Critical Forum is to bring together a provocative range of 
intellectual perspectives on the intersections of banality and war, with 
both terms broadly conceived and explored in different historical and 
disciplinary contexts. Rather than establish a single framework, core 
issue, or consensus on the banalization of war, we invited contributors to 
participate in the forum in whatever way they thought especially relevant 
to the theme of this special issue. The wide range of approaches in 
each short think piece highlights the interplay and divergence between 
them, as contributors offer their responses to the banalization of war as 
condition, practice, object of analysis, or mode of critique. But a crucial 
idea emerges from Ania Loomba’s “The Everyday Violence of Caste” that 
is surely applicable to all the contributions in this special issue. That is 
Loomba’s argument that while a critique of the banalization of war in 
Western societies may be necessary, we should not construct the West 
as the exclusive site of a new predicament or as the privileged locus of 
historical experience, but should look to understand social developments 
across and beyond such boundaries.
NOTES
1 On the reimagining of twentieth and twenty-first century war and its 
relationship to temporality, see Mary Dudziak’s War Time: An Idea, Its History, Its 
Consequences (2013), and Rey Chow’s The Age of the World Target: Self-Referentiality 
in War, Theory, and Comparative Work (2006). On the militarization of ocean 
space and its relationship to migration, see Elizabeth Deloughrey’s “Heavy 
Waters: Waste and Atlantic Modernity” (2010).
2 For an overview of this tendency see the ACLU’s report War Comes Home: 
The Excessive Militarization of American Policing (2014) and Kraska (2007). An 
updated record of police killings in the United States through 2015 is available 
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at The Counted website: www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2015/
jun/01/the-counted-police-killings-us-database.
3  Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. “banal.”
4  As Caygill notes, this separation and opposition of violence and civility was 
challenged from within the post–Enlightenment philosophical tradition by 
G. W. F. Hegel (1994, 22–28). Notably, in “The German Constitution,” Hegel 
warned that “the change from the [feudal] right of private warfare [Faustrecht; 
literally ‘fist right’] to politics should not be regarded as a transition from 
anarchy to constitutionalism,” or from violence to civility. Instead, “the true 
principle remains the same, and the change is purely superficial” (1999, 48–49). 
Hegel pursues the implication of violence and civility obscured in modernity 
in the section on “Absolute Freedom and Terror” in The Phenomenology of Spirit: 
see Hegel 1977, 355–363. As Caygill notes (1997), Hannah Arendt rewrites Kant’s 
trajectory towards perpetual peace by reinserting the violence of civility in 
“Karl Jaspers: Citizen of the World”: “the abolition of war . . . would harbor its 
own peculiar dangers; the various armies . . . would be replaced by federated 
police forces, and our experiences with modern police-states and totalitarian 
governments . . . are not apt to make us overoptimistic about this prospect” 
(1968, 93–94).
5  For an insight into the role of entrapment and the use of informers in this new 
political ecology, see the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice report 
Targeted and Entrapped: Manufacturing the “Homegrown Threat” in the United States 
(CHRGJ 2011).
6  This claim is made at some length in Bettina Stangneth’s recent study, 
Eichmann Before Jerusalem (2014). Graham MacPhee provides a detailed rebuttal 
in “Arendt After Jerusalem” (2015).
7  This understanding of Arendt’s project as the rethinking of the Mitsein of 
Dasein is proposed by Howard Caygill (1997).
8  In effect, Arendt is redeploying Hegel’s concept of recognition within a context 
orientated towards plurality. For perceptive analyses of the unacknowledged 
echoes of Hegel in Arendt, see Tsao (2004) and Buchwalter (2013).
9  LeMahieu’s invocation of the Little Rock Nine in the essay is also an important 
opportunity to remember Hannah Arendt’s own extraordinary blindness to 
the historical reality of the United States, as revealed perhaps most glaringly in 
her “Reflections on Little Rock” (2003), first published in 1959.
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